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In a nice addendum to the compilation of Israeli and Western past and current official views about the so-called Iranian “threat” provided by Just Foreign Policy, the Christian Science Monitor’s Dan Murphy has categorized Israeli views on the political spectrum. Here are some Israeli “doves” on Iran:

1. Meir Dagan. The former head of the Mossad, who served from 2002-2011, called a unilateral Israeli attack on Iran “the stupidest thing I have ever heard” in March. He said that full success in destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities is unlikely, and that the likely outcome would be for the country to redouble it’s clandestine nuclear efforts in response to attack and remove all supervision from the International Atomic Energy Agency. He also worries about a broader war. “It will be followed by a war with Iran. It is the kind of thing where we know how it starts, but not how it will end.”

2. Yuval Diskin. Mr. Diskin ran the Shin Bet from 2005-2011. In April, he declared both Netanyahu and Barak unfit to lead Israel, accused them of “misleading the public on the Iran issue,” and said that contrary to their position that military action would deter Iran “many experts say that an Israeli attack would accelerate the Iranian nuclear race.”

3. Gabi Ashkhenazi. Gen. Ashkenazi, who was chief of staff of the IDF from 2007-2011, said in April that an attack on Iran would be a bad idea now, while expressing grave concern about Iran’s nuclear program. “I think we still have time. It is not tomorrow morning” when Israel needs to act, he said. “It is better to persuade our friends in the world and the region that it is a global threat and [the government] has done a good job on this.”

Recent news out of Israel prompts me to write briefly about a recent experience.

Three weeks ago I was asked to serve as an adviser to the participants in a dispute-resolution exercise at a British academy. The focus of the exercise was Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. The participants were divided into four teams: Iran, Gulf Arab states, Israel, and the West.

After various alarums and excursions that took the participants to the brink of a war in the Gulf, the Israelis decided that they should talk to the Iranians. A “high-level Norwegian diplomat” was conjured up to convey a request for talks to Tehran. The Iranian team was unready to engage directly but was content for the Norwegian to shuttle back and forth as an intermediary.

When time ran out, Iran and Israel were on the verge of agreeing to cease demonising each other; to refrain from interfering in each other’s affairs; to desist from covert operations against each other; and to accept each other’s nuclear and missile assets in return for some kind of no-first-use assurance. In short, they were heading towards a mutually acceptable modus vivendi. This seemed likely to lower tensions in the region and reduce the likelihood of a war that might end up costing many lives and affecting the living standards of billions.

The Western team was relieved by this development and hastened to settle the enrichment dispute by concluding an NPT deal with Iran. The Arab group had decided early on that their over-riding interest was to avoid the outbreak of conflict in the Gulf. They had set out to strengthen their relations with Iran and to build bridges between Iran and the West—even at one early point between Iran and Israel, albeit unsuccessfully. So they had no difficulty with an NPT deal, recognising that the most likely alternative to a negotiated settlement of the nuclear dispute is conflict, sooner or later.

I am not pretending this scenario can be transposed to the real world. All the participants in this exercise were British. Their understanding of relevant historical and cultural factors was limited. Their emotions were hardly in play, not enough, at any rate, to impact on their reasoning. And yet….

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Not according to many current and former Israeli and U.S. officials. Following are just a few recent quotes opposing that notion from a thorough and useful compilation by the folks at Just Foreign Policy:

Iran poses a serious threat, but not an existential one.

- Dan Halutz, Former Israeli Defense Force Chief of Staff, YNet, February 2, 2012

I think the Iranian leadership is composed of very rational people.

- Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, Israeli Chief of Staff, Haaretz, April 25, 2012

Any war with Iran would be a messy and extraordinarily violent affair, with significant casualties and consequences.

- Colin H. Kahl, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2012

In response to a worrying trend in U.S. politics, Lobe Log publishes “Hawks on Iran” every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Weekly Reads/Watch:

- News: Iran, U.S. Need Direct Talks to Break Deadlock, Mousavian Says (Vienna)
- News: Israeli elections likely to postpone any deliberations on Iran strike
- News: Israel Formally Receives Fourth Nuclear-Capable Sub
- News: Iran Embargo Impossible to Meet as Ships Need Its Oil
- Opinion: Israeli Dissent May Create More Space for Iran Nuclear Deal
- Opinion: California Senator Takes a Stand for Political Solution in Iran
- Opinion: Iran: Ever-resilient but maybe more malleable
– Opinion: Election Year = No Iran Deal
- Opinion: Why Logic May Prevail on Iran
- Opinion: Dysfunctional Congress Threatens Iran Talks
- Video: Containment: A Viable Strategy for Iran?
- Research Publication: China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations

Jamie M. Fly/Robert Zarate, Weekly Standard: A common argument touted by hawks these days is that President Obama should seek regime change in Syria because Iran would be weakened from the loss of a major ally. The neoconservative-dominated Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) have led that call and this week FPI Executive Director Jamie M. Fly (an Iraq war hawk who has never been shy about his hopes for Iran) and Policy Director Robert Zarate claimed that if Obama doesn’t forcefully intervene in Syria, scary Iran will be emboldened by the U.S.’s refusal to force change in other countries:

If the United States still can’t bring itself to stop the mortally wounded Assad regime (which lacksnuclear weapons) from murdering its own people and destabilizing its neighbors, then how likely is it to deal with much harder cases in the Middle East—like a nuclear-armed Iran that starts inflicting Syria-like mass atrocities on its own people or menacing its own neighbors? Indeed, not only Damascus and Tehran, but also America’s allies and partners throughout the world, are waiting and watching to see whether the Obama administration and Congress will truly side with the Syrian people and show resolve against Assad.

Unabashed hawk Jennifer Rubin, who regularly argues that the U.S. should wage war on Iran for Israel and often regurgitates commentary from FPI and FDD staffers, was quick to feature Fly and Zarate’s article at her Washington Post perch.

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via Think Progress

A growing number of current and former Israeli officials are voicing concern that attacking Iran may prove counterproductive in deterring Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon. Last week, former Israeli internal security chief Yuval Diskin warned that attacking Iran may “encourage them to develop a bomb.”

In an interview on Tuesday, former Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) intelligence head Shlomo Gazit joined the chorus warning against attacking Iran. Gazit agreed with Diskin that attacking Iran would not destroy Iran’s nuclear program, and could even accelerate it, the Jerusalem Post reports:

The public discourse over a strike largely neglected the likelihood that Iran would resume its program after being attacked, Gazit noted.

He said he agreed with Diskin that an Israeli attack would not destroy the program, and could even accelerate it, while enabling Iran to legitimize its efforts diplomatically.

Diskin raised eyebrows last week when he slammed Barak and Netanyahu as “our two messiahs” and charged:

[Israel's leadership] presents a false view to the public on the Iranian bomb, as though acting against Iran would prevent a nuclear bomb. But attacking Iran will encourage them to develop a bomb all the faster.

But Gazit urged those who agree with Diskin’s assessment to direct their criticisms to the electorate:

Even if they have messianic considerations, this is not important. They were legally elected through a ballot, and Diskin should direct his claims [against them] to the electorate.

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Greg Thielmann, a former intelligence official with more than 3 decades of service under his belt, knows a thing or two about intelligence on alleged nuclear weapons programs. He argued during the beginning of the U.S.’s war on Iraq that the intelligence he and his team presented to the Bush Administration about Iraqi activities was misrepresented prior to the invasion. Thielmann had the highest security clearances and reported directly to unabashed hawk, John Bolton. These were his words during a July 2003 Arms Control Association (ACA) briefing:

Now, from my perspective as a former mid-level official in the U.S. intelligence community and the Department of State, I believe the Bush administration did not provide an accurate picture to the American people of the military threat posed by Iraq. Some of the fault lies with the performance of the intelligence community, but most of it lies with the way senior officials misused the information they were provided.

Thielmann was set to retire in 4 months but resigned early from the Bush administration in protest over the politicization of intelligence. In 2009, he told CBS News that responsibility for the U.S.’s unjust war on Iraq was shared by all but that

The main problem was that the senior administration officials have what I call faith-based intelligence. They knew what they wanted the intelligence to show.

Thielmann is currently a fellow at the ACA, an anti-nuclear proliferation organization where he focuses, among other things, on Iran. (Read my interview with ACA executive director Daryl Kimball here.)

Now, while the Obama administration is making a visible effort to handle its Iran intelligence more carefully, the same cannot be said about the presentation of widely available official information about Iran’s nuclear program by many U.S. broadcast media outlets. In the clip above, CNN’s Jonathan Mann fails to mention Thielmann’s important background or Israel’s widely suspected though undeclared nuclear weapons arsenal, but does offer ample alarmism about Iran’s nuclear activities even though the Israeli official statements he bases it on actually counter it. After Thielmann says that recent acknowledgement by Israeli military officials that Iran has not decided to make a nuclear weapon and is a rational actor coincide with U.S. military assessments, Mann voices his own confused interpretation:

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In response to a worrying trend in U.S. politics, Lobe Log publishes “Hawks on Iran” every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Weekly Reads/Watch:

- News: Iran Envoy: Tehran might sign NPT protocol allowing snap inspections of nuclear facilities
- News: Iran Considers Halting Nuclear Expansion to Avert EU Oil Ban
- News: Israel’s top general says Iran unlikely to make bomb
- Video: Amanpour interviews former Iranian nuclear negotiation insider about weaponization plans
- Report: What to do about U.S. Sanctions and Israeli Threats: Iran’s Muted Nuclear Debate
- Report: Iran and Israel: Comparing military machines
- Report: Iranian Hard-Liners Send Positive Signals on Talks
- Report: Netanyahu Iran Policies Rejected By Increasing Numbers in Israel
- Opinion: Iran, Istanbul and the future

Jennifer Rubin/Sen. Joe Lieberman, Washington Post: The militantly pro-Israel blogger who constantly criticizes President Obama for not going to war with Iran, paraphrases Senator Joe Lieberman’s (I-CT) related comments from an interview:

He acknowledges the concern that if talks drag out Iran will conclude we are unserious and will continue full steam ahead with its nuclear weapons program. So how do we prevent the rope-a-dope game? Lieberman begins with the premise that if Iran “is approaching a nuclear weapons capability, then we have to act militarily” unless Iran in essence surrenders its program. “They should never feel we are turning down economic and diplomatic pressure” while talking,” he says.

In this he thinks Congress has a role. Either by passing a resolution explicitly opposing a “containment” strategy or by adding “another layer of sanctions,” he contends, it is vital for Congress to act before the May 23 talks. That, he believes, is the only way to convey American resolve.

A resolution opposing containment essentially commits the U.S. to war with Iran as Paul Pillar has pointed out and yet Lieberman wants Congress to act prior to the next round of talks. Why?

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Thomas R. Pickering, with his long and distinguished career in the U.S. diplomatic service, has emerged as a brave and reputable advocate for real diplomacy with Iran. While the idea of a U.S.-waged military conflict is generally considered a high-cost and low-benefit scenario (though war drums can still be heard), the notion of pursuing engagement is still rather taboo in Washington. So Pickering is brave because he’s not simply anti-war, he’s pro-engagement, and he is making his points in a political climate where Israeli and American pro-Israeli pressure for more punitive measures against Iran is high and public opinion seems more afraid of Iran than afraid of a war with Iran, no doubt influenced by some loud and dangerously ignorant voices. Pickering has nevertheless been gracefully relentless, like the true diplomat that he is. On Monday, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published his take on the recent talks between Iran and Western powers in Istanbul. He writes:

Two thoughts at this point are relevant for the future of Iranian negotiations: First, the openness of both sides to “expert-level” talks — such as those between the assistants to EU foreign policy chief Lady Catherine Ashton and the Iranian representative to the talks, Saeed Jalili — is at least an effort to take things from the general and procedural toward the potentially specific. The Iranian side seems to be interested in a step-by-step process that will make obligations reciprocal and presumably equal in some fashion, and that is based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the latter element a code word that conveys the Iranians want acceptance of their right to enrich uranium, presumably for civil purposes only. Such an agreement could be in accord with the treaty, but it would run counter to the Security Council resolution that seeks a freeze on enrichment in Iran. There are now new openings for progress. Experts could help bridge the gaps. The parties’ willingness to try to do so will be a further positive signal.

The second thought: The current political situation provides some impetus for progress. Given a willingness on both sides to seek agreement, the pressure of sanctions against Iran, and Israeli interest in some kind of a military strike before the US elections, efforts to maximize this opening would constitute a wise and fruitful course of action.

And this is how Pickering ended his recent testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, more words from the wise:

An Iranian friend of mine who has played an important role in Iranian foreign policy over the years once told me that “The historical record shows that every time we have been ready, you have not been, and every time you have been ready, we have not been.” Maybe we can emerge from that  position of the past to begin with some small things – that we can find the way to pull the curves mutual of interest together rather than have them continue to bend apart.

Former Sen. Bob Kerrey, who is running to reclaim his seat after serving for most of the past decade as head of the New School, has come out strongly against war on Iran. Here’s the video of his statement:

This deserves some notice for a few reasons. First, Kerrey, who was highly decorated for his service in Vietnam, was an Iraq War hawk and even served on the notorious Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. Second, he’s a moderate Democrat identified more with the interventionist wing of the part than the more non-interventionist and anti-war McGovernite wing. Third, he’s running to replace retiring Sen. Ben Nelson, perhaps the most conservative member of the Senate Democratic caucus and a reliable supporter of AIPAC-backed legislation and resolutions.

I think his willingness to take such a strong position so early in what is likely to be a tough campaign for him in a very conservative state is due to several factors, not least his close ties to the Pentagon, the government bureaucracy that appears most strongly opposed to attacking Iran, be it by Israel or the U.S. itself. But I also think public opinion, of which an experienced politician like Kerrey has a pretty good sense, has been moving against the idea of war against Iran (although there are no very recent polls on the question) since Israeli and Republican saber-rattling hit a high back in early March with the AIPAC Convention. I also think the pushback by much of the foreign-policy and military establishment against what Obama called the “loose talk of war” at that time has also had a major impact. And the fact that there have been relatively few denunciations of the the Istanbul talks in mid-April by anyone other than Netanyahu and a familiar clutch of neo-conservative hawks here also suggests that war fever has been significantly reduced, at last for now. But Kerrey’s strong position on this issue is one very interesting straw in the wind.

Green Zones of the Mind, Guerrillas, and a Technical Knockout in Afghanistan

By Nick Turse

Republished by Tom Dispatch

Recently, after insurgents unleashed sophisticated, synchronized attacks across Afghanistan involving dozens of fighters armed with suicide vests, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms, as well as car bombs, the Pentagon was quick to emphasize what hadn’t happened.  “I’m not minimizing the seriousness of this, but this was in no way akin to the Tet Offensive,” said George Little, the Pentagon’s top spokesman.  “We are looking at suicide bombers, RPG [rocket propelled grenade], mortar fire, etcetera. This was not a large-scale offensive sweeping into Kabul or other parts of the country.”

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta weighed in similarly.  “There were,” he insisted, “no tactical gains here. These are isolated attacks that are done for symbolic purposes, and they have not regained any territory.”  Such sentiments were echoed by many in the media, who emphasized that the attacks “didn’t accomplish much” or were “unsuccessful.”

Even granting the need to spin the assaults as failures, the official American reaction to the coordinated attacks in Kabul, the Afghan capital, as well as at Jalalabad airbase, and in Paktika and Logar Provinces, reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of guerrilla warfare and, in particular, of the type being waged by the Haqqani network, a crime syndicate transformed by the conflict into a leading insurgent group.  Here’s the “lede” that should have run in every newspaper in America: More than 40 years after the Vietnam War’s Tet Offensive, after more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, even after reviving counterinsurgency doctrine (only to see it crash-and-burn in short order), the U.S. military still doesn’t get it.

Think of this as a remarkably unblemished record of “failure to understand” stretching from the 1960s to 2012, and undoubtedly beyond.

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