This week Al Jazeera English (AJE) aired a program that speaks to an article we published on Monday by Dr. Emile Nakhleh, a former top Central Intelligence Agency officer and Mideast expert. Nakhleh argues that by continuously repressing reform movements within their country, the autocratic rulers of Bahrain, Syria and Yemen are fomenting an environment where sectarianism and terrorism can flourish. Western support has also led to the entrenchment of these regimes:

Arab regimes mistakenly thought that autocracy, not democracy, was critical for fighting terrorism and that Western support for human rights in Arab countries would dilute such an effort. Because Arab autocrats were pliant partners, western governments, unfortunately, became addicted to autocracy, which in turn helped autocrats become more entrenched.

In the segment above, the two former U.S. officials agree with investigative journalist Jeremy Scahill that their government’s approach to Yemen (and Pakistan) is fraught with problems and could lead to serious blowback such as terrorism against U.S. targets, but then claim that there’s not much else that can be done. Is that really what U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is about? Doing something that you know does more harm than good because you can’t think of anything better? Scahill, who has been traveling in and out of Yemen on assignment over the past two years had this to say:

We are actually making America less safe in our response in Yemen right now …. Our own policies, the drone strikes, the support for a corrupt regime, the lack of any substantial funding for civilian infrastructure … then all the money that’s needed for counter-terrorism, supporting military units in Yemen that are perceived as being the Saleh family military rather than the national military has sparked a response of blowback where you now have a situation that people who would not have been inclined to support al-Qaeda are actually joining with the AQAP in a kind of marriage of convenience to rise up against the central government.

Earlier this month interviewee Robert Grenier, a former counter-terrorism official at the CIA, also argued in an AJE op-ed that the U.S. may be turning Yemen into a mini-Waziristan through drone attacks that kill civilians:

One wonders how many Yemenis may be moved in future to violent extremism in reaction to carelessly targeted missile strikes, and how many Yemeni militants with strictly local agendas will become dedicated enemies of the West in response to US military actions against them. AQAP and those whom it trains and motivates to strike against civilian targets must continue to be resisted by the joint efforts of the civilised world. But the US would be wise to calibrate its actions in Yemen in such a way as to avoid making that obscure and relatively limited and containable threat into the Arabian equivalent of Waziristan.

But despite these warnings the U.S.’s drone warfare on Yemen is escalating with AJE reporting at least 24 drone strikes in 2012 so far that have killed dozens. Too bad for Yemeni villagers and their families who suffer the consequences regardless of whether or not they are directly targeted and Yemeni children who are starving at an atrocious rate. Too good for Al Qaeda operatives who welcome U.S. actions that assist their recruiting efforts. And yet, there’s not much else that we can do…

In a debate last night with Jeremy Ben Ami of the liberal pro-Israel group J Street, neoconservative don Bill Kristol told the audience in the New York synagogue that he had no problems with President Obama’s Israel policies. But just two months ago, a right-wing pro-Israel group Kristol heads rolled out the latest of its serial attacks on Obama’s policies toward Israel.

The Weekly Standard editor praised Obama and said the difference between Obama’s Israel policies and presumptive GOP nominee Mitt Romney’s “is not that great.” Kristol stated that he was “happy to agree with Obama to a considerable degree.” He went on:

I’ve been mostly supportive of the Obama administration in the last couple of years…

I think President Obama has moved sufficiently on these issues from the Cairo speech in 2009 to the AIPAC speech of two months ago, that the difference between the parties is less than it was.

But as Haaretz and WNYC pointed out, the Kristol-led Emergency Committee for Israel (ECI) consistently lambasts Obama on Israel. The group ran ads in Washington around its campaignasserting Obama was “not pro-israel.” In December, Kristol, in an ECI statement, said Obama “keeps acting to weaken the security of the state of Israel.” (Earlier that year, right-wing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whom Kristol frequently praises, said that under the Obama administration “our security cooperation is unprecedented.”)

Just two months ago — far from the “last couple years” Kristol has been “supportive” of Obama’s policies — the hedge fund-bankrolled ECI released a 30-minute anti-Obama online film, complete with ominous music. In the film, Kristol associate Liz Cheney says Obama attempted to “put distance” between the U.S. and Israel. Neocon pundit Charles Krauthammer says Obama “delegitimized” Israel, and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Lee Smith said Obama’s “narrative fit [a] rejectionist and resentful narrative.”

This isn’t the first time ECI’s attacks on the Obama administration’s Israel policies have been revealed as disingenuous political maneuvers. Last May, ECI executive director Noah Pollak, commenting via Twitter, publicly praised Obama’s speech on the Middle East, but ECI later condemned the speech in an attack ad. When ThinkProgress revealed the hypocrisy, Kristoldisowned the tweets in comments to the Washington Post’s Jennifer Rubin. Rubin added: “Kristol graciously avoided pointing out that while Pollak has the executive director title, the group is firmly under the control of Kristol and his two co-founders.”

With ECI “firmly under the control of Kristol,” and with Kristol now “happy to agree with Obama to a considerable degree” on Israel, will the organization lay off its right-wing attacks on the president? “We’re trying to decide,” Kristol told WNYC.

Congressional debate over the defense budget has set Republicans in the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) against the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta endorsed the president’s proposed base budget, House Republicans are fighting for an additional $4 billion in funding and $8 billion above caps set by the Budget Control Act.

On Friday, House Armed Services Committee member Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA) took to Fox News, claiming that the budget cuts endorsed by, among others, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey would undermine U.S. national security:

FORBES: If you listen to what the Navy says, it will reduce the number of ships in our navy down to the lowest level in a hundred years. [...] But worse than that is that fact that, for the first time, we’re moving dangerously close to not being able to guarantee the security of the United States of America. And I don’t think the American people want us to be there.

Watch the clip:

But Forbes’ argument for higher defense spending is undermined by the facts. Politifact examined the argument about the reduction in naval ships, and concluded that:

[A] wide range of experts told us it’s wrong to assume that a decline in the number of ships or aircraft automatically means a weaker military. Quite the contrary: The United States is the world’s unquestioned military leader today, not just because of the number of ships and aircraft in its arsenal but also because each is stocked with top-of-the-line technology and highly trained personnel.

Thanks to the development of everything from nuclear weapons to drones,comparing today’s military to that of 60 to 100 years ago presents an egregious comparison of apples and oranges.

And the Center for American Progress’s Lawrence J. Korb, Melissa Boteach and Max Hoffmanlooked at the Republican defense budget proposal and found that strategic cuts to our defense budget, including reducing our nuclear stockpile, can be implemented without undermining national security. In an issue brief earlier this year, Korb and Alex Rothman observed that budget cuts could save $600 billion over a decade without undermining national security. “Unnecessary defense spending does not make our nation safer,” they wrote.

While Republicans claim that budget cuts would damage national security, keeping the defense budget sequestration cuts — which for FY 2013 would limit the budget to $472 billion — would allow the Pentagon to spend at its 2007 level, a year in which even defense hawks weren’t complaining about the budget being too low, for the next decade. This budget would keep real defense spending above the Cold War average, a period in which the U.S. faced a genuine existential threat from the Soviet Union.

Today, Forbes kicks off the “Defending our Defenders” tour in which House Republicans will hold town-hall events across the country in a push to persuade voters to oppose defense cuts and support GOP efforts to boost the coming year’s defense budget. They face an uphill battle. Polling data released last week shows that 65 percent of American think defense spending is already too high.

The former Secretary of Defense to the George W. Bush and Obama administrations Robert Gates said in an interview on CBS aired this morning that getting Iran to give up any potential ambitions to nuclear weapons was the “only good option” for dealing with the nuclear standoff with the West. He warned that an Israeli attack on Iran could spark a regional war.

Interviewer Charlie Rose asked Gates about his comment that Iran was the toughest challenge he has faced. Gates suggested, in line with the Obama administration, that a diplomatically negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis was the sole way to deal with the issues without major drawbacks. Gates said:

GATES: The only good option is putting enough pressure on the Iranian government that they make the decision for themselves that continuing to seek nuclear weapons is actually harming the security of the country and, perhaps more importantly to them, putting the regime itself at risk. And there are signs that those sanctions are beginning to really bite and some much more severe European Union sanctions will come into effect this summer.

ROSE: What if Israel does it on its own?

GATES: That would be worse than us doing it. Because I think that then has lots of regional complications that may end up in a much larger Middle East conflict. So I think that would be worse.

Watch the video:

Gates has offered warnings about attacking Iran before, declaring that even a U.S. strike would be a “catastrophe.” So his statement that an Israeli strike would be “worse” is significant. And a Pentagon wargame reported by the New York Times this year found the U.S. got dragged into the conflict after an Israeli strike.

A top U.S. security thinktank that advises the Pentagon released an article in its journal yesterday advising against a U.S. or Israeli strike against Iran. The article from the RAND Corporation by, among others, top former U.S. diplomat James Dobbins, noted that a strike “would make it more, not less, likely that the Iranian regime would decide to produce and deploy nuclear weapons” — in line with assessements from some top former Israeli officials. The RAND article called for more U.S.-Israeli cooperation and for the U.S. to quietly “support the assessments of former and current Israeli officials who have argued against a military option.” Many former top Israeli security officials have criticized Israel’s hawkish government for an eagerness to attack Iran without dealing with potential consequences of such an attack.

Gates seemed to be using shorthand when discussing Iran’s “continuing to seek nuclear weapons.” While a potential Iranian nuclear weapon is widely considered a threat to both the security of the U.S. and its allies in the region, as well as the nuclear non-proliferation regime, reports on U.S. and Israeli estimates state that these intelligence agencies don’t believe Iran has made a decision to build nuclear weapons. Those estimates give the West time to pursue a dual-track approach of pressure and diplomacy to resolve the crisis. American officials including President Obama vow to keep “all options on the table” to deal with the Iranian nuclear program, but questions about the efficacy and consequences of a strike have led U.S. officials to declare that diplomacy is the “best and most permanent way” to resolve the crisis.

Direct talks have been a rarity since 1979. But Iranians and Americans got together constructively in Geneva in the autumn of 2001 when Iran was offering help for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, and for some time after that an informal back-channel was kept open.

To secure Iranian agreement to direct talks now, it would make sense to work through an intermediary. The Turkish and Omani governments spring to mind. Turkey and Oman are long-standing friends of the US, but are also friends of Iran (even if the Syrian crisis has created strains in the political relationship between Ankara and Tehran). Algeria might also be ready to help, as it did in 1980-81.

In Tehran approval for talks would have to come from the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Approval would not be a “slam-dunk”. The Leader’s public pronouncements over the years suggest a profound distrust of U.S. sincerity (which mirrors wide-spread American distrust of Iranian good faith). His statements also imply that he considers the U.S. arrogant and aggressive and finds this deeply offensive.

In August 2010, for instance, he is reported to have said:

We have rejected negotiations with the U.S. for clear reasons. Engaging in negotiations under threats and pressure is not in fact negotiating. For the same reason Iranian officials have stated that the Islamic Republic is ready to engage in negotiations but not with a U.S. that is seeking to conduct negotiations under threats, sanctions and bullying.

At Friday prayers on 3 February 2012 he said:

We should not fall for the smile on the face of the enemy. We have had experience of them over the last 30 years…. We should not be cheated by their false promises and words; they break their promises very easily … they feel no shame … they simply utter lies.

So any U.S. initiative could fall on stony ground–unless the White House were to find some way of convincing Ayatollah Khamenei that this time it’s different. For that they have one invaluable asset: the President. To many non-Americans he comes across as a decent man, whose commitment to making the world a better place is sincere. His speeches on foreign policy in 2009 were devoid of arrogance and suggested a new United States of America, bent on respecting other states’ rights.

But the White House would also need to fashion its public diplomacy carefully. Calls on Iran to demonstrate its sincerity, to show it can be trusted, and to build confidence in its intentions would go down badly in Tehran.

Nine years have passed since Iran admitted to the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) that it had failed to declare the acquisition of small quantities of nuclear material, and the use of a fraction of that material to test a few primitive centrifuge machines and conduct laser enrichment experiments. Those failings were soon remedied, as the IAEA Statute required. No further non-declarations have come to light since (unless one believes what has not been proved: that Iran had no intention of declaring the Fordow plant in 2009). The declaration of basic nuclear weapons research is not required by the NPT.

For two years after its initial admissions Iran volunteered cooperation that went beyond what the NPT requires, only desisting after the IAEA Board demonstrated that it would not tolerate Iran making full use of its NPT rights.  Thereafter Iran cooperated as required by the NPT; only on a point of legal interpretation has the IAEA found fault.

Trust between nations is built through negotiation, not by the peremptory setting of arbitrary tests. A good international agreement includes provisions for verifying compliance, so that the longer the parties remain compliant, the more confident they can be in one another’s good faith.

Of course arrogance and aggression are diplomatic expressions of power. There are circumstances, e.g. the 1995 Dayton peace process, in which they can be effective dispute resolution tools. But the evidence is that they do not work with Iran. Having what it takes to survive when put under pressure is vital to Iran’s sense of self. Successful defiance of U.S. power enables Iran to demonstrate to itself and to other non-aligned countries that it is on the way back from 200 years of humiliation at Western and Russian hands.

A further complication lies in the fact that more issues divide the U.S. and Iran than the nuclear controversy. Americans reckon that the Islamic Republic has harmed U.S. interests in many ways over the last 32 years. It’s natural that this has generated much bad feeling.

But this too is a mirror image of what Iranians feel. Those 32 years have witnessed the U.S. siding with Saddam Hussein in his unlawful invasion of Iran, awarding a medal to an officer responsible for shooting down an Iranian airliner, excluding Iran from the Madrid Middle East peace conference despite cooperative Iranian behaviour, rewarding Iran’s leaders for their help in Afghanistan by branding them as “evil”, trying to cripple the Iranian economy through sanctions, flirting with “regime change”, and threatening unauthorised use of force against Iranian assets.

The combined list of Iranian and U.S. grievances is so long that the only sensible way forward is for both parties to let bygones be bygones and convince one another that they want to focus on improving their relationship. That means identifying where U.S. and Iranian interests overlap and giving expression to that overlap through language that is negotiated fair and square.

Is the White House ready for that kind of engagement? Can they afford to be so reasonable, and unaggressive, in an election year? If they can’t, they’d be well-advised to keep their distance. The last thing the world needs right now is a further twist in the downward spiral of US/Iranian relations.

Peter Jenkins was the UK’s Permanent Representative to the IAEA for 2001-06 and is now a partner in ADRg Ambassadors.

This cynical calculus allowed Arab autocrats to claim that protests were directed from the outside and resistance was the work of terrorist groups. In Egypt and Tunisia, regimes fell while popular protests were still peaceful.

In Yemen and Libya, regimes refused to leave and instead used bloody repression. While they failed to quell protests, some opposition groups were forced to militarize. In Bahrain and Syria, regimes have changed the narrative from human rights and reform to sectarianism, using the divide and rule approach. Their self-fulfilling prophecy of terrorism has come to pass because of their conscious policy to discredit the opposition and shore up their legitimacy.

While successful in the short-run, this policy is destined to fail in the long run. Domestic terrorist groups that could emerge from the opposition would not only target regime assets; they will go after U.S. and other western economic interests and personnel in those countries.

In Bahrain, for instance, Sunni vigilantes and even some government officials are encouraged by elements within the ruling family to direct their anger against Americans for their perceived support of pro-reform dissidents. Some regime conservatives increasingly view the Americans, the Shia majority, and Iran as an unholy alliance undermining the Khalifa rule.

The recently appointed minister of information Samira Rajab is anti-Shia, anti-American, and a fan of Saddam Hussein. She blames foreign media and outside provocateurs for the problems in her country—a similar narrative to that of the Assad regime in Syria.

The traditional faction within the Bahraini ruling family, including the Prime Minister, is turning to Saudi Arabia for support. The king and his son the crown prince Salman are committed to an independent and more inclusive country. Unfortunately, they have been marginalized by the older members of the family council and their younger xenophobic Sunni supporters.

By inviting Bahrain’s crown prince to Washington last week, the administration was sending a signal to the conservative faction that it still supports the king and his son and their plan to seek meaningful dialogue with the opposition. The other part of Washington’s message is that the resumption of some arms shipments that were halted after last year’s uprising applied to the coast guard and would not be used against the Bahraini people. It gave Salman something to take back, but indirectly signaled to the old guard that the young prince, not his great uncle, is the preferred interlocutor with Washington. Of course, to save face the old guard has touted the release of the arms as a sign that they are still in Washington’s graces.

It’s clear that Saudi Arabia is trying to expand its hegemony over the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), beginning with Bahrain. The Prime Minister Khalifa and his supporters within the ruling family no longer seem to care about the sovereignty of Bahrain or its historically liberal tradition. Their main concern is their own survival. In the 1980s I wrote a book on the GCC and highlighted some of the challenges that would face the organization down the line. I’m afraid, it’s coming home to roost.

If the proposed Saudi-Bahraini federation is concluded, Bahrain would cease to exist as an independent state and would become a province under Saudi suzerainty. The Saudis and their Khalifa quislings would expand their repression of the Shia community and Sunni human rights activists in the name of fighting Shia and Iran. The opposition will likely arm, and domestic terrorist groups would emerge in both countries.

In Syria, human rights protests similarly started peacefully but have been forced to defend themselves with arms confiscated from the military and obtained from the outside. The Assad regime continues to kill and torture civilians. Like Bahrain, Assad is blaming foreign provocateurs and terrorists for the bloodshed. The regime’s acceptance of the Kofi Annan plan is a rouse to placate the international community and buy the regime more time.

The Annan plan is doomed to fail because the regime views the domestic situation as a zero-sum game. It believes its survival can only be assured through continued repression and control. Negotiating with the opposition is a fantasy that Assad cannot afford to indulge in if his Alawite minority rule is to survive.

Since 9/11 Arab autocrats have cooperated closely on counterterrorism with the US and other western countries. At the same time, they branded domestic dissidents and pro-democracy activists as radicals and urged western governments not to fret over their harsh tactics against their citizens.

Arab regimes mistakenly thought that autocracy, not democracy, was critical for fighting terrorism and that Western support for human rights in Arab countries would dilute such an effort. Because Arab autocrats were pliant partners, western governments, unfortunately, became addicted to autocracy, which in turn helped autocrats become more entrenched.

Arab rulers seem to forget that many non-Western democracies, including Muslim Indonesia and Turkey, also have been strong partners with western governments in fighting terrorism. The fall of the dictators in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya would not preclude these countries from fighting terrorism.

Arab Islamic autocrats co-operate in the fight against terrorism to preserve their rule; whereas democracies do so to protect their societies and way of life.

Washington and other Western capitals should make it clear to the remaining Arab dictators, in word and in deed, that the game is up. They must implement genuine political reform or step aside. The world cannot tolerate a resurgence of terrorism because of their repressive rule and sectarian politics.

Dr. Emile Nakhleh is the former director of the CIA Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program, a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico and a National Intelligence Council Associate. He is the author of A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World and Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society.

Weekly Reads/Watch:

News: Iran nuclear talks: Are sanctions on the table?
News: Iran Talks ‘Will Fail’; Oil Risk Prevails: Roubini Analyst
News: U.S. Treasury Claim of Iran-Al-Qaeda “Secret Deal” Is Discredited
News: Biden: Israel still has time to strike Iran
News: Ayatollah Khamenei gives Iran nuclear talks unprecedented legitimacy
News: Pinched Aspirations of Iran’s Young Multitudes
Opinion: Roundtable on Iran Crisis, Part 2: On Attacking Iran
Opinion: Critical Threshold in the Iran Crisis
Opinion: What an Israeli attack on Iran will mean for the Muslims
Opinion: Zakaria: Under Netanyahu, Israel is stronger than ever
Opinion: Deconstructing Krauthammer’s Misinformation On Iran And Israel
Opinion: Israeli generals balk at PM’s Iran policy
Watch: “Deja Vu All Over Again?: Iraq, Iran and the Israel Lobby”

Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post: The Post’s militantly pro-Israel blogger gleefully opines that the Israeli Prime Minister’s new coalition government increases Benjamin Netanyahu’s ability to strike Iran and defy President Obama:

A more broad-based, secularized government with latitude to strike Iran and to move cautiously on the “peace process”? J Street’s worst nightmare — an emboldened Netanyahu without the baggage of the religious right. Good luck stirring up opposition to that here or in Israel.

The irony is rich. Netanyahu is riding high while his nemesis, President Obama, is struggling for his political life. The latter will be in a weakened position to challenge the former on Iran or much else for the balance of the year.

Elliott Abrams, World Affairs: George W. Bush’s neoconservative Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams argues in favor of an Israeli attack on Iran if the U.S. fails to wage war first:

President Obama, like many world leaders, has called an Iranian nuclear weapon “unacceptable.” He is right, and that should remain the US position—not just that it would be a bad outcome, not just that we would be angered by it, but that we refuse to accept it and, as the president also once said, will prevent it. If we are unwilling to act, or to act soon enough, it should be our position that Israeli action is justifiable.

It’s telling, by the way, that Abrams uses belligerent Iranian anti-Israel rhetoric to justify his call to war while failing to mention that almost every day we read something about how Israel, nuclear-armed and in possession of the world’s top militaries, might strike Iran. He also fails to mention that a figure who actually matters recently stated that Iran does not seek military confrontation with Israel. You can argue that the Supreme Leader’s adviser Mohammad Javad Larijani was lying, but then again, when has Iran militarily invaded another country? Remember, the Iran-Iraq war was initiated by Saddam Hussein who actually used chemical weapons against Iranians and his own people. And how many times has Israel militarily and covertly attacked other countries in the last 60 years? When has Iran militarily occupied territory? In the case of Israel, the question would not be when, but for how long. You can argue that all Israeli aggression has been self-defense, but you’d have to apply the same standard to Iran too, no? And then where would we be?

Robert Wexler, Foreign Affairs: The former house Democrat who now heads a pro-Israel organization called the S. Daniel Center for Middle East Peace makes a long-winded argument for a U.S. war on Iran after the other options he outlines have been exhausted according to his terms:

Moreover, it is clear that should a military option ultimately prove necessary, an American-led strike would best serve Israel and the Middle East generally.

A strike led by the United States would allow for the creation of a large international coalition of nations, similar to the coalition built by President George H. W. Bush in the lead-up to the Gulf War. The US, unlike Israel acting unilaterally, would be able to gain the support of its European allies, NATO assistance, and a degree of official and unofficial support from the Arab world. Just as the Gulf states shouldered the vast bulk of the financial burden for the first Gulf War, a coordinated effort could allow for them to play a comparable role in this case.

Top Israeli military officials have also stressed their deep preference for an American-led strike. Israel’s former head of military intelligence, Major General (ret.) Amos Yadlin, wrote in a recent New York Times op-ed: “America could carry out an extensive air campaign using stealth technology and huge amounts of ammunition, dropping enormous payloads that are capable of hitting targets and penetrating to depths far beyond what Israel’s arsenal can achieve.”

Yadlin went on to aptly suggest that “Mr. Obama will therefore have to shift the Israeli defense establishment’s thinking from a focus on the ‘zone of immunity’ to a ‘zone of trust.’ What is needed is an ironclad American assurance that if Israel refrains from acting in its own window of opportunity—and all other options have failed to halt Tehran’s nuclear quest—Washington will act to prevent a nuclear Iran while it is still within its power to do so.”

Patrick Clawson, Foreign Affairs: In January the Washington Institute’s (WINEP) director of research endorsed covert deadly attacks on Iran. Clawson’s line of reasoning implied that only military options were available:

Mr. Clawson said the covert campaign was far preferable to overt airstrikes by Israel or the United States on suspected Iranian nuclear sites. “Sabotage and assassination is the way to go, if you can do it,” he said. “It doesn’t provoke a nationalist reaction in Iran, which could strengthen the regime. And it allows Iran to climb down if it decides the cost of pursuing a nuclear weapon is too high.”

This week he said that the goal of U.S. sanctions should be regime change. That’s the essence of his argument, regardless of all the other wonderful things he also talks about:

Whether or not diplomacy results in an agreement, the sanctions have already fulfilled the core objective of the Obama administration — namely, kick-starting negotiations. But that is not the right goal. Given Iran’s poor track record of honoring agreements, negotiations remain a gamble because they may never lead to an agreement, let alone one that can be sustained. Rather than focus on talks that may not produce a deal, then, the United States should place far more emphasis on supporting democracy and human rights in Iran. A democratic Iran would likely drop state support for terrorism and end its interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries such as Iraq and Lebanon, improving stability in the Middle East. And although Iran’s strongly nationalist democrats are proud of the country’s nuclear progress, their priority is to rejoin the community of nations, so they will likely agree to peaceful nuclearization in exchange for an end to their country’s isolation.

The United States could assist democratic forces in Iran by providing money and moral support. It could fund people-to-people exchanges and student scholarships; support civil society groups providing assistance to Iranian activists; work closely with technology companies such as Google on how to transmit information to the Iranian people; and overhaul Voice of America’s Persian News Network, where journalistic standards have suffered under uneven management. It could also raise human rights abuses in every official meeting with Iranian officials, such as the ongoing nuclear negotiations, and bring Iranian rights violations to the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, understands the danger of a popular revolution in his country and has done everything in his power to prevent it. If the United States is going to take a risk, it should aim not for a partial, insecure nuclear arrangement but the best return possible — a democratic Iran.

The bill says it is the policy of the United States to ensure Israel’s security, including by providing arms and developing a joint missile defense system, and to take other steps, such as fighting against anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations. It also calls on the United States to help produce an “Iron Dome” defense system that Israel could use to intercept short-range missiles.

The bill also calls for reports on how to speed the sale of F-35 fighter planes to Israel and the state of Israel’s military edge. And finally, it would extend a $9 billion loan guarantee program that can help Israel borrow more cheaply. The program was established in 2003, and $3.8 billion of the loan guarantee authority remains.

From the text of the bill:

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States:

(1) To reaffirm the enduring commitment of the United States to the security of the State of Israel as a Jewish state. As President Obama stated on December 16, 2011, ‘America’s commitment and my commitment to Israel and Israel’s security is unshakeable.’. And as President Bush stated before the Knesset on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel on May 15, 2008, ‘The alliance between our governments is unbreakable, yet the source of our friendship runs deeper than any treaty.’

(2) To provide Israel the military capabilities necessary to deter and defend itself by itself against any threats.(3) To veto any one-sided anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations Security Council.

(4) To support Israel’s inherent right to self-defense.

(5) To pursue avenues to expand cooperation with Israel in both defense and across the spectrum of civilian sectors, including high technology, agriculture, medicine, health, pharmaceuticals, and energy.

(6) To assist Israel with its on-going efforts to forge a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that results in two states living side by side in peace and security, and to encourage Israel’s neighbors to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state.

And here’s Republican Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (the main pusher of an amendment to the now passed H.R. 1905 which would make it illegal for U.S. officials to even speak to Iranian officials unless a special waiver is issued 2 weeks in advance!) expressing her approval:

This bill expresses the sense of Congress that our country should support an increase to the totality of our bilateral security relations—from joint missile defense systems, intelligence cooperation, and military exercises between the United States and Israel, to increasing Air Force training, as well as providing increased excess defense articles and munitions to Israel.

This legislation also seeks to counter the Israel-bashing that has become common place in international forums such as the United Nations. The United States must not allow Israel to be isolated and demonized in international organizations, and must work together to withdraw U.S. participation in and funding from organizations that do so.

After a short and half-hearted attempt, the Obama administration, willingly or otherwise, fell into the trap of effectively continuing the Bush administration’s one-track policy of ratcheting up pressure in the hope that the Iranians will finally cry uncle. Meanwhile, hard-line Israeli influence on domestic US political dynamics prevents Obama from making do with existing draconian sanctions on Iran that more or less constitute economic warfare. Nothing he does is deemed sufficient; there is a consistent requirement for yet more measures to squeeze Iran yet further, and cease uranium enrichment that brings it closer to the status of a real or virtual nuclear state.

The problem with this approach is that the current Iranian leadership perceives itself as left with few options apart from responding to belligerent policies with belligerence of its own. It believes the Obama administration, despite protestations to the contrary, is like its predecessor: more interested in regime change and destabilization than resolving the nuclear issue. Hence, in its response, the Iranian leadership has made a calculated decision to demonstrate it will not be a passive recipient of decisions made by others. It has thus highlighted the costs of escalating sanctions, whether through threats to obstruct or shut down oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz; permitting protestors to attack the British Embassy; or threatening to halt oil exports to European states before European sanctions against Iran’s Central Bank come into effect in July.

This escalating sanctions regime and threat scenario naturally increase the prospect of an accidental conflagration in the Persian Gulf, where both Iran and the US have a substantial military presence and lack sufficient means of communication. In short, the potential for this presumably controlled game of brinksmanship to spin out of control will continue to increase if the current round of negotiations fails to produce results.

Farhi also points out that for the Israelis nothing is more important than maintaining the numerous benefits they derive from their take-but-no-give relationship with the United States:

The current Israeli approach is intended to consolidate Obama’s repeated assurances about America’s unbreakable bond with Israel no matter how much Israeli policies violate international law or threaten American interests in the region. In this calculation, the resolution of the nuclear issue is deemed more dangerous than Iran becoming a state with nuclear-weapon capability, because a resolution will eventually direct attention, even in Israel itself, away from Iran and towards the occupation of Palestinian lands. It will also enhance Iran’s ability to project power in the region, weakening an Israeli strategic superiority seen as dependent upon uncritical US support for Israeli policies.

This is why hard-line advocates of Israel in the US have worked so hard to limit the Obama administration’s options towards Iran through congressional action. For instance, an amendment to the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act not only mandates sanctions on firms and countries that deal with Iran’s Central Bank or buy Iranian petroleum; it also denies the President the power to repeal those sanctions during negotiations in exchange for changes in Iranian policies. Unlike the previous measures, now only Congress can lift the most severe sanctions ever imposed. Various Israeli lobbies in the US have even tried, so far unsuccessfully, to promote congressional legislation that effectively bans any diplomatic interaction with Iran. Pending resolutions in both the Senate and House also call for complete suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities, a verifiable end to Iran’s ballistic missiles program, and additionally “oppose any policy that would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.” Considering that Iran has repeatedly and emphatically stated that it would not accept any deal that would deprive it of its recognized rights as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under international scrutiny, such maximalist demands have no other purpose than to prevent a resolution on the basis of some sort of compromise.

The United States claims that sanctions against Iran are designed to convince it to change its behavior on a range of issues, but even the language used to describe them tells a different story. Sanctions are central to the Obama administration’s “dual-track” strategy – explained as a combination of pressure and engagement intended to increase US leverage at the negotiating table. As Iranians struggle with increasingly “crippling” measures, advocates are justifying the resulting pain as the alternative to war.

No single influential figure has made war with Iran seem like a prospect more than Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, despite warnings against the dire ramifications from key Israeli and western security advisers. Yet it was Netanyahu who inspired more standing ovations during a May 2011 hardline speech to Congress (29 in total) than Obama did during his state of union address in January of that year, and it has been Congress that has been pushing forward the harshest measures against Iran.

While Obama criticized the “loose talk of war” that was rampant during the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) conference in March, discussions of sanctions by the administration remain heavily focused on the punitive element – in response to ongoing pressure from Israel and a seemingly pro-Netanyahu Congress. Obama’s unwillingness to match his red line on Iran (acquirement of a nuclear weapon) with Netanyahu’s red line (acquirement of “breakout capability”) is a key reason why relations between the two leaders remain publicly cool. At the same time, the administration’s efforts to project an image of toughness toward the Islamic Republic significantly overshadow any displays of confidence-building diplomacy.

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